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Abstract
Studies have shown that political variables 
can infl uence the volume of government debt 
and have recommended investigating the joint 
effects of diverse factors on the risk of local 
government default. Considering the relation 
between economic management and political 
constraints, this paper examines the joint infl u-
ence of political and systemic factors on the risk 
of loan default by Spanish local governments. To 
do so, we analyze 148 city councils for the period 
2006-2011, using a logit model with panel data 
and an artifi cial neural network. 
The empirical results indicate that the fi nan-
cial risk of local governments is affected both by 
political factors specifi c to each case and, simul-
taneously, by systemic variables for the country. 
Specifi cally, political variables such as the mayor 
not having economics-related university studies, 
the under-representation of female councilors 
in the municipal corporation, municipal govern-
ment by a party with a progressive ideology, and 
ideological alignment between the municipal and 
the regional government are all associated with 
greater fi nancial risk. Moreover, rising nation-
al unemployment, an increased sovereign risk 
premium, the impact of the electoral cycle, and 
that of declining economic growth are all factors 
that may increase the risk of default. The fi nd-
ings presented are of great potential interest for 
governments, managers, national and interna-
tional fi scal authorities, fi nancial regulators, and 
citizens at large, because an understanding of 
the signifi cance of these variables can help au-
thorities make appropriate decisions to prevent 
and/or overcome problems related to municipal 
insolvency.
Keywords: default risk, local governments, 
political factors, systemic factors.
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1. Introduction
 e economic recession that began in 2008 led to high levels of bank debt and bud-
get defi cits in the public sector, reducing solvency and restricting access to the credit 
market, as well as jeopardizing the sustainability of public services.  e debt crisis 
produced great concern about credit risks, among policymakers, fi nancial regulators, 
and fi scal authorities. Researchers concluded that it was necessary to study the causes 
of high levels of local government (LG) default in order to design and implement cor-
rective and preventive policies and thus put government fi nances on a sound footing 
and in a position to meet debt and defi cit targets (Aldasoro and Seiferling, 2014; World 
Bank Group, 2015; European Commission, 2012; Council of the European Union, 2011; 
Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, 2018; Navarro-Galera et al., 2015; 
Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina, 2016; Beetsma and Vermeylen, 2007).
 e debt crisis has been particularly worrying in countries such as Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal, Greece, and Spain. International organizations have concurred with aca-
demic studies that public debt in these countries is of such a magnitude that major 
problems of repayment may arise and that there are worrying diﬀ erences between 
public revenue and expenditure (European Commission, 2012; Aldasoro and Seifer-
ling, 2014; Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina, 2016; Navarro-Galera et al., 2015).
In this context, taking into account that fi nancial institutions are the main credi-
tors of LGs, researchers have considered it especially interesting to study the risk of 
loan default (Arbatli and Escolano, 2015; Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina, 
2016; Elgin and Uras, 2013; Guillamón, Bastida and Benito, 2011). Various studies, 
including Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina (2016), Elgin and Uras (2013) and 
Geys and Revelli (2011), have analyzed the infl uence of variables such as absolute 
majority government and political fragmentation on the volume of bank debt and on 
sustainability. However, these papers examined only individual factors pertaining to 
each LG and did not address the causes of default risk.
Despite the valuable conclusions presented in the above papers, many organiza-
tions in the fi eld of public fi nances argue that a comprehensive analysis of govern-
ment credit risk should include, besides political factors (which are specifi c to each 
entity and may be dependent on election outcomes), systemic ones, such as the mac-
roeconomic cycle, fi scal policy, and the electoral cycle, in view of the vulnerabili-
ty of individual government entities to macroeconomic changes and the volatility of 
non-controllable variables (Aldasoro and Seiferling, 2014; Local Government Associ-
ation of South Australia, 2019; Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, 2014; 
World Bank Group, 2015; US Department of the Treasury, 2013).
In view of the above considerations, the aim of this paper is to advance our un-
derstanding of the factors that infl uence LG credit risk. Assuming an interconnection 
between political decisions and economic management, we study the joint eﬀ ects of 
political and systemic variables on the probability of bank loan default, following the 
Basel II rules (BCBS, 2006). To do so, we analyze 148 large Spanish LGs during the 
period 2006-2011, using a logit model with panel data and an artifi cial neural net-
106
work. From the results obtained, we identify political and systemic factors underlying 
the risk of LG insolvency.  e conclusions drawn provide useful new knowledge for 
policymakers, managers, fi nancial analysts, regulators, national and international tax 
authorities, voters, users of public services, citizens at large, and other stakeholders.
2.  e impact of political and systemic variables on credit risk
under Basel II rules
We study the causes of credit risk by considering the probability of default (PD) 
as a fi nancial indicator. In line with previous research in this fi eld, our analysis takes 
into account the defi nition of default, or breach of bank payment commitments, estab-
lished by the Basel II Banking Supervision Commi ee (Castrén, Dées and Zaher, 2010; 
Bluhm and Overbeck, 2003; Gordy, 2003), according to which a higher probability of 
default is associated with a greater expected loss, a greater need for capital and, there-
fore, a higher risk-adjusted rate of interest.
Considering the diﬀ erent default scenarios considered under Basel II, our study 
incorporates a dependent variable addressing these possibilities through an abili-
ty-to-pay process (APP), which measures LGs’ capacity to meet their credit liabilities 
(Bluhm and Overbeck, 2003).  is APP depends on the quality of LG assets and fi nan-
cial resources and is a latent random variable that is not directly observable, but which 
can be estimated using a nonlinear discrete-choice approach, namely the logit panel 
data model, which is an appropriate means of considering the factors that contribute 
to the likelihood of debt default (Bonfi m, 2009; Jacobson, Lindé and Roszbach, 2013). 
In addition, to study the phenomenon of government insolvency, we construct an ar-
tifi cial neural network (ANN), in the knowledge that previous researchers have used 
ANNs as a complement and an advance on parametric techniques. In most cases, this 
approach enhances the analytical process.
In this respect, the standard known as Basel II (BCBS, 2006) is a highly signifi cant ad-
vance in the international fi nancial system as this model helps ensure the soundness and 
stability of credit institutions, making it possible to assess the fi nancial risks associated 
with the institutions, such as governments, to which these entities make loans. In par-
ticular, the Basel II model seeks to ensure that banks implement new tools to strengthen 
the capital requirements arising from their credit risk operations, focusing both on the 
market and on operational aspects. Accordingly, the model proposes tools with which 
fi nancial institutions can estimate the default risk on the loans made to their customers.
According to Gordy (2003), a local government (LGi) is in default if its ability to 
pay at any given time APPit is below a certain level of credit liability (cit). Under this 
approach, default by LGi in the period t is a random dichotomous variable Yit such that:
?
?
?
?
?
?
>
≤
=
itit
itit
it cAPP or t time at default not doesLG  the if  
cAPP or t time at defaultsLG  the if  1
Y
0    (1)
where the probability of LGi default at time t is equal to
( ) ( )itititit cAPPPYPPD ≤=== 1        (2)
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Following the methods used in previous studies of credit risk in the business sector 
(Castro, 2013; Mileris, 2012), we analyze two types of credit risk factor, as variables 
expected to infl uence the probability of default: political factors and systemic factors. 
Political factors impacting on credit risk (Z
it
) are specifi c to each local government. In 
contrast, systemic credit risk factors (X
t
) include aspects of the macroeconomic cycle, 
fi scal policy, and the electoral cycle, with respect to the country. 
In this paper, the following initial premises are assumed: (1) local governments 
form a homogeneous segment within the public sector; (2) the systemic factors X
t
 that 
infl uence credit risk aﬀ ect all local governments at time t (t = 1, …  , T); (3) the idiosyn-
cratic political factors Z
it
 (i = 1, …  , Nt, t = 1, …  , T) that infl uence credit risk individually 
aﬀ ect each LG
i
; (4) the idiosyncratic LG factors (individual or LG-specifi c factors) are 
not entirely independent of systemic eﬀ ects, an aspect that is particularly signifi cant 
in economic recessions (Bonfi m, 2009).  us, the APP
it
 variable of the i-th LG at time t 
is a function of the political and systemic variables, as in expression (3):
ititktjit uZXAPP +++= δβα        (3)
where β
j
 and δ
k
 are the parameter vectors estimated by a linear panel data model 
and u
it
 is the random perturbation.  en, following Rösch (2003) and Bonfi m (2009) 
a borrower L
g
 is considered to be unpaid if its APP
it
 falls below the level c
it
 (credit 
obligations). Although the variable APP
it
 is latent and not directly observable, the ex-
planatory variables X
t
 and Z
it
 and the systemic and political factors, together with the 
independent binary variable Y
it
, the indicator of default, are directly observable, from 
the sample data.
In our study, credit risk was determined via the estimation of PD, using a logistic 
regression model and an ANN.  is procedure was adopted for several reasons. First, 
discrete-choice models are held to be appropriate when the research aim is to analyze 
the determinants of the probability of an individual economic agent (Jacobson, Lindé 
and Roszbach, 2013). Second, the two models we use meet all the statistical require-
ments specifi ed in the Basel II rules (BCBS, 2006) and in Bank of Spain Circular 3/2008 
for calculating PD.  ird, the European Commission (2015), Aldasoro and Seiferling 
(2014), the World Bank Group (2015) and the US Department of the Treasury (2013) 
have all recognized the need to study the joint eﬀ ect of idiosyncratic factors (or in-
dividual ones, for a single entity) and systemic factors (such as the macroeconomic 
cycle, fi scal policy, and the electoral cycle) in the measurement of government credit 
risk.
3. Research method
3.1. Sample selection
 is empirical study focuses on large LGs in Spain, in the view that international 
organizations (European Commission, 2012; Aldasoro and Seiferling, 2014) and pre-
vious research (Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina, 2016; Navarro-Galera et al., 
2015; Guillamón, Bastida and Benito, 2011) have all concluded that bank debt in local 
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and regional governments in Spain is too high (in fact, it is among the highest in the 
Eurozone).
Following Guillamón, Bastida and Benito (2011) and the criteria of the Local Gov-
ernment Modernization Act no. 57/2003, we selected 148 municipalities, all with over 
50,000 inhabitants or, otherwise, provincial capitals, taking data for the period 2006–
2011, i.e., from three years before the economic crisis until three years a er its appear-
ance.
 is sample is appropriate for our research aim for the following reasons: (a) the 
introduction to the Local Government Rationalization and Sustainability Act no. 
27/2013 recognizes that large LGs present major problems of insolvency and defi cient 
fi nancial management; (b) these governments have a large volume of bank debt (Bank 
of Spain, 2014; Beetsma and Vermeylen, 2007); (c) the European Comission (2012) and 
credit rating agencies such as Moody’s (2013) have observed that the fi nancial situa-
tion of large LGs in Spain is one of the most alarming in the Eurozone, and (d) the gov-
ernments selected for analysis account for over 38.7 per cent of all LG spending and 
represent 56 per cent of the Spanish population; moreover, they oﬀ er a wide range of 
services, including public transport, local police, wastewater treatment, waste dispos-
al and sports facilities (IGAE, 2014; Fundación La Caixa, 2014).
3.2. The dependent variable
In this study, the dependent variable is the Y
it
 of the LGs in the sample, assessed 
according to the four fi nancial indicators that determine when APP
i
 is lower than the 
credit liability, according to the defi nition of default in the Basel II rules and in accor-
dance with Spanish legislation on local government (Royal Legislative Decree 2/2004, 
of 5 March, approving the consolidated text of the Local Finance Regulatory Act). 
Hence, following the criteria used in previous studies of local government fi nance 
(Moody’s, 2013, 2008; Navarro-Galera et al., 2015), we assume that APP
i
 is lower than 
the credit liability and, therefore, that a local government is at risk of default (or at 
risk of defaulting on loan repayment obligations) when it meets at least one of the 
situations identifi ed by the four fi nancial indicators stipulated in Table 1, in line with 
the recommendations of the BCBS (2006).
3.3. The independent variables
Table 2 shows the political and systemic variables analyzed jointly in this study, 
together with their defi nitions and the expected sign of the relationship between the 
explanatory variables and PD. As discussed below, these variables were selected tak-
ing into account previous research on LG debt and ratings (Gaillard, 2009) and the 
classifi cation of factors generally used by the credit rating agencies S&P’s (2011, 2009) 
and Moody’s (2013, 2008).
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3.3.1. Political variables
With respect to the fi rst group of political variables, i.e., the profi le of the mayor, 
Ryan, Pini and Brown (2005) studied the implications of diﬀ erent leadership styles on 
innovation in LGs. In this area, neither Massolo (1991) nor Guillamón, Bastida and 
Benito (2011) found any evidence that the mayor’s gender might infl uence the evolu-
tion of the volume of LG debt. In the present study, following Navarro-Galera et al. 
(2017) and Benito, Bastida and Muñoz (2010), we include three possible explanatory 
variables with respect to the mayor’s profi le: gender, university background and aca-
demic profi le (studies related to economics). Based on previous research fi ndings, we 
expected a negative relationship between these variables and PD, i.e. when the mayor 
is male, has no university degree or has a degree in a subject unrelated to economics, 
each of these circumstances will increase PD.
Regarding the LG profi le, we selected fi ve variables for analysis, in line with pre-
vious research fi ndings. In this respect, Lago and Lago (2009) and Ashworth, Geys 
and Heyndels (2005) all concluded that political competition (defi ned as the absence 
of an absolute majority in the municipal corporation) is associated with greater fi scal 
pressure, higher levels of defi cit and debt, and fewer available resources.  ese fi nd-
ings suggest that political competition may have a harmful impact on PD. Taking into 
account that political competition could increase the volume of debt, we expect to fi nd 
a positive sign in the corresponding estimator; in other words, governments with no 
absolute majority are more likely to experience loan default.
Geys and Revelli (2011) and Roubini and Sachs (1989) concluded that greater po-
litical fragmentation can worsen the budget defi cit and, therefore, increase municipal 
debt. Consequently, we examine the specifi c infl uence of this variable on PD and ex-
pect to obtain a positive sign in the estimator, showing that the greater the fragmen-
tation, the greater the PD.
Various studies (Cabaleiro-Casal and Buch-Gomez, 2015; Guillamón, Bastida and 
Benito, 2011; Lago and Lago, 2009; Ryan, Pini and Brown, 2005; Ashworth, Geys and 
Heyndels, 2005) have concluded that greater strength in the governing political par-
ty is associated with higher levels of debt and defi cit. However, Galli and Padovano 
(2002) found that a lower degree of political strength leads to greater indebtedness 
and, therefore, to greater diﬃ  culty in meeting loan maturities. To resolve this ques-
tion, we use the Herfi ndahl index to examine whether the political strength of the 
governing party aﬀ ects PD; in this respect, either a positive or a negative sign may be 
expected in the estimator.
Another interesting political factor is that of gender. Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 
(2007) and Jennings (1983) concluded that male councilors tend to present a more ac-
tive political commitment than their female counterparts. In another study, Geys and 
Revelli (2011) observed that the presence of a higher proportion of women in the gov-
erning party is associated with higher municipal tax revenues, which suggests that 
the fi scal pressure and the defi cit would be lower in these cases. Although the la er 
studies did not analyze the infl uence of the percentage of female councilors on PD, 
113
their fi ndings suggest that this variable may be of interest, and therefore we included 
it for analysis, expecting a negative sign in the estimator, in the sense that the greater 
presence of women in the governing party would be associated with a lower PD.
According to some studies, the political ideology of the governing party (conser-
vative versus progressive) can infl uence fi nancial decision making (Cabaleiro-Casal 
and Buch-Gomez, 2015; Bastida, Benito and Guillamón, 2009). In this respect, Balagu-
er-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina (2016) and Bel and Miralles (2010) concluded that 
le -wing parties are more likely than conservative ones to adopt expansive spending 
policies, thus increasing levels of debt and leading to greater diﬃ  culties in meeting 
payment obligations.  erefore, for this variable we expect to fi nd a positive sign in 
the estimator.
Finally, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) studied variables related to the po-
litical context and reported fi nding a positive relationship between the ideological 
alignment of local and regional governments and the volume of transfers received. 
 is circumstance could reduce the need for debt and, consequently, the risk of insol-
vency. However, Bastida, Benito and Guillamón (2009) recorded a negative infl uence 
between this ideological alignment on spending and fi scal revenues. In the present 
study we analyzed two variables, corresponding to the ideological alignment of the 
local government with the regional government and with the central government, 
expecting to fi nd that, in each case, this would increase PD.
3.3.2. Systemic variables
Regarding macroeconomic variables related to the political cycle and to monetary 
and fi scal policy, Van Der Burgt (2009) argued that, under the Basel II regulatory 
framework, PD should be calculated as a long-term average of default rates, in the 
view that this time scale corresponds to that of the economic cycle.  erefore, and 
following Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortona-Ausina (2016), we employed a dichoto-
mous variable (the economic cycle) that defi nes the periods of expansion or recession 
of macroeconomic indicators.  e la er authors suggested that this variable could in-
fl uence the volume of debt and be related to LG insolvency; as such, this variable was 
included for analysis as a possible determinant of PD, and its sign was expected to be 
positive (thus, in the years of economic expansion, PD would be lower). In addition, 
Arbatli and Escolano (2015), Navarro-Galera et al. (2015) and Balaguer-Coll, Prior and 
Tortona-Ausina (2016) have suggested that a higher level of economic activity and 
a higher rate of national unemployment may be associated with increased LG debt. 
 erefore, our empirical study included the variables rate of growth of the national 
economy (GDP) and rate of unemployment, expecting a negative sign in the fi rst case 
and a positive one in the second.
 e electoral cycle has also been identifi ed as one that may infl uence LG spending. 
According to Blais and Nadeau (1992), LGs spend more in the years preceding elector-
al processes and less in post-electoral years, which could aﬀ ect levels of government 
defi cit and debt. If this were so, the electoral cycle could aﬀ ect PD, and we included 
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this variable for analysis, expecting a positive sign for its estimator. Finally, state-
ments by agencies such as the IMF (Aldasoro and Seiferling, 2014) and the European 
Commission (2015), as well as previous research fi ndings (Mackey, 2014) suggest that 
the national risk premium should be included for analysis, and that a positive sign 
should be expected, i.e. a higher risk premium is associated with a greater likelihood 
of loan default.
3.4. Statistical models
 e empirical results required to calculate local government PD were obtained us-
ing a parametric technique, that of logistic regression with panel data, together with a 
non-parametric one with a particular ANN, the multilayer perceptron (MLP).
 e main purpose of our logistic regression model is to accurately predict the out-
come category for individual cases, using the most parsimonious model. To achieve 
this goal, we designed a model that included all the variables expected to be useful for 
predicting the dependent variable.  e variables can be introduced into the model by 
stepwise regression, following the order specifi ed in previous studies, and testing the 
fi t of the model a er the inclusion of each coeﬃ  cient.
 e logit panel data parametric technique is used to analyze the correlation be-
tween unobserved factors. According to Train (2003), this approach eliminates the 
bias derived from the existence of unobservable and time-invariant heterogeneity, 
making it very appropriate for the characteristics of our sample. Since the dependent 
variable is binary, and starting from equations (2) and (3) presented in section 2, the 
relationship between the dependent variable and the risk factors can be established 
by means of a logit model with panel data, which makes it possible to estimate the 
probability of default by LGi at time t as a function of political and systemic factors 
according to expression (4), where the parameters and are obtained by maximizing the 
value of the likelihood function.
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Next, a particular artifi cial neural network, the MLP, was designed with a sigmoid 
activation function, calculated with the logistic activation function .  is is also used 
in the hidden layer of the MLP, taking arguments of real value and transforming them 
into the range (0,1).  e output layer contains the target (dependent) variables. Ac-
cordingly, the output of the neural network, from a vector of inputs (x
1
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Finally, we designed two statistical models with the following characteristics:
(a) in Model 1, the independent variables are exclusively the political variables (pro-
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fi le of the mayor, profi le of the government and political context); (b) in Model 2, the 
independent variables are the same political variables plus the systemic ones (macro-
economic variables, electoral cycle, and fi scal policy).
4. Analysis of the results
Our empirical results show that 486 cases (54.73 per cent) met the default condi-
tion, and that 402 (45.27 per cent) did not. Table 3 shows the estimated coeﬃ  cients 
transformed into odds ratios or Exp (β) of the logistic regression with random eﬀ ects, 
both for Model 1 (political variables) and for Model 2 (political and systemic variables).
Table 3: Variables included in the logit data panel model
Variable
MODEL 1 MODEL 2
Coef. (β) Std. Err. Exp (β) Coef. (β) Std. Err. Exp (β)
ECO -0.532984 (*) 0.225101 0.586851 -0.560156 (**) 0.256441 0.571119
COUNw -0.305011 (***) 0.010912 0.737114 -0.326942 (***) 0.027350 0.721126
IDEO 0.535823 (***) 0.161321 1.708855 0.550748 (***) 0.202082 1.734550
REG 0.813490 (**) 0.155750 2.255767 0.792837 (**) 0.187701 2.209656
GPD -0.129452(**) 0.106566 0.878577
UNEMPL_RATE -0.164493(***) 4.800214 0.848324
RISK_PREM 2.135564(***) 3.195407 8.461818
C_ELECT 0.279005(***) 0.379201 1.321814
cons -1.39932 (***) 0.4681596 -1.854608 (***) 1.648971
Log likelihood: 286.12
Wald chi-square: 89.52; sig.: 0.000
Chi-square: 39.52; sig.: 0.000
Hausman (1978) test: 12.11: sig.: 0.1297
Log likelihood: 237.44
Wald chi-square: 81.56; sig.: 0.000
Chi-square: 35.08; sig.: 0.000
Hausman (1978) test: 11.74: sig.: 0.1353
Note: (*), (**), (***) represent signifi cance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels.
Source: The authors
 e MLP results for the normalized importance of each variable (Figure 1) show 
that stronger weights are assigned to systematic variables and other variables found 
to be signifi cant when logistic regression by panel data is applied.  erefore, the vari-
ables included as signifi cant in Table 3 are those with the greatest explanatory capaci-
ty of local government PD, which demonstrates the robustness of the values and signs 
obtained.
Moreover, as shown in Table 5, the inclusion of systemic factors in the credit risk 
analysis signifi cantly improved the logistic regression panel data results obtained, 
from 69.26 per cent correct classifi cation in Model 1 to 72.18 per cent in Model 2.  e 
classifi cation matrix values obtained by the ANN were 72.97 per cent correct for Mod-
el 1 and 74.89 per cent for Model 2. Consequently, including systemic variables and 
making use of an ANN design to calculate PD improved the correct classifi cation by 
5.63 percentage points.
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Figure 1: Normalized importance of the variables in MLP
Source: The authors
 e results obtained for Model 2, with each of the two techniques used (Table 
3), show that four variables are of a systemic nature and four are political, which 
confi rms the joint, balanced impact of both types of factors on PD. However, if we 
consider the number of variables of each type, the representativeness of the systemic 
variables (four out of fi ve) is greater than that of the idiosyncratic ones (four out of 
ten), which suggests that the impact of non-controllable factors is greater than that of 
controllable ones.
Our analysis by individual variables shows that the mayor’s having a university 
degree in an economics-related subject is a signifi cant variable, with a sign equal to 
that expected; in other words, when a local government mayor has this educational 
background there is a lower probability of default.  is fi nding advances upon the 
conclusions of previous studies (Benito, Bastida and Muñoz, 2010; Guillamón, Bastida 
and Benito, 2011), which did not examine the relationship with PD, but only analyzed 
the volume of debt.
Second, we fi nd that the proportion of female councilors in the municipal corpo-
ration is inversely related to PD, which implies that increasing the number of women 
in the LG team could reduce the risk of default. Previous research has only reported 
evidence of the eﬀ ect of this variable on tax revenues (Geys and Revelli, 2011), and 
therefore our results are novel, corroborating the specifi c infl uence of female repre-
sentation in the municipal government on the risk of PD.
With respect to political ideology, we fi nd that LGs with a progressive ideology 
are associated with a greater PD, which extends the conclusions of previous research
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Table 4: Classifi cation matrix
LOGIT PANEL DATA (MODEL 1)
Observed Prediction
Y
Correct percentage
Non-Default Default
Y
Non-Default 266 136 66.17%
Default 137 349 71.81%
Overall percentage 69.26%
LOGIT PANEL DATA (MODEL 2)
Observed Prediction
Y
Correct percentage
Non-Default Default
Y
Non-Default 292 110 72.64%
Default 137 349 71.81%
Overall percentage 72.18%
NEURAL NETWORK (MODEL 1)
Observed Prediction
Y
Correct percentage
Non-Default Default
Y
Non-Default 291 111 72.39%
Default 129 357 73.46%
Overall percentage 72.97%
NEURAL NETWORK (MODEL 2)
Observed Prediction
Y
Correct percentage
Non-Default Default
Y
Non-Default 299 103 74.38%
Default 120 366 75.31%
Overall percentage 74.89%
Source: The authors
fi ndings (Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina, 2016; Bel and Miralles, 2010) ac-
cording to which progressive governments are more likely than conservative ones to 
adopt expansive spending policies, giving rise to higher volumes of debt and greater 
diﬃ  culties in meeting payment obligations.
With respect to public policies, a comprehensive analysis of government solvency 
on the basis of default risk should include, as well as variables refl ecting the decisions 
of policymakers and citizens (idiosyncratic variables), systematic factors whose behav-
ior is not subject to these circumstances, but which nevertheless should be understood 
and taken into account, in order to eﬀ ectively manage credit risk. Our fi ndings suggest 
that policy makers need to be well informed about the detrimental eﬀ ects on public ser-
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vices of an increased risk of municipal default, which may occur when policymakers do 
not have a background in economics, when the government has a progressive ideology 
and when female councilors are under-represented in the corporation. If politicians are 
sensitive to the possible negative consequences of these circumstances, a more prudent 
and viable approach may be adopted in their fi nancial planning.
With respect to the infl uence of the systemic variables considered, we identify 
four that may aﬀ ect LG credit risk. As shown in Table 3, the fi rst systemic variable 
considered is that of the growth rate of the national economy (i.e., GDP). In this re-
spect, a signifi cant, inverse association was observed; this was in line with our expec-
tations and suggested that a fall in the GDP may increase LG credit risk.  is fi nding 
contrasts with previous studies (Arbatli and Escolano, 2015; Balaguer-Coll, Prior and 
Tortosa-Ausina, 2016), which reported the infl uence of GDP on the volume of govern-
ment debt, but did not study its eﬀ ect on PD. Another statistically signifi cant variable 
is the national unemployment rate.  is variable, too, was found to be inversely asso-
ciated with PD, which is in accordance with previous research fi ndings (Arbatli and 
Escolano, 2015; Navarro-Galera et al., 2015).
 e third signifi cant systemic variable is the national risk premium, which pre-
sented a positive sign, as expected.  is result empirically corroborates the conclu-
sions of Aldasoro and Seiferling (2014), the European Commission (2015) and previous 
research (Mackey, 2014), and suggests that an increase in the risk of sovereign debt 
is eventually refl ected in a greater PD in LGs, given the interrelations between lo-
cal, regional, and central governments, and the current and capital transfers made. 
In line with Gaillard (2009), Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina (2016) and Na-
varro-Galera et al. (2015), we assume this factor is non-controllable. Our analysis also 
shows that the electoral cycle may infl uence the default risk of local governments 
(specifi cally that PD may increase during pre-election periods) as observed previously 
by Blais and Nadeau (1992).
 ese fi ndings for the systematic variables are relevant to the decisions of policy 
makers.  ese variables cannot be directly controlled by politicians and their signifi -
cance leads us to consider that annual budgets should be prepared taking into account 
the foreseeable evolution of the macroeconomic variables, by means of multiannual 
planning techniques and scenario analyses. Trends in these variables should be taken 
as warning signs, with the potential to impact on access to bank credit and on the cost 
of borrowing.
Finally, these fi ndings may be useful for managers in other countries, too.  e sig-
nifi cance of the idiosyncratic variables considered (the ideology of the governing par-
ty, the proportion of female councilors and the educational background of the mayor) 
is in line with the conclusions of previous work on debt and fi nancial sustainability, 
carried out in countries such as Netherlands, Finland, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Ger-
many or Belgium (Jennings, 1983; Geys and Revelli, 2011). In addition, the explanatory 
variables (such as unemployment and the risk premium) were selected taking into 
account previous research in this fi eld in countries such as Norway, Italy or Canada 
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(Arbatli and Escolano, 2015; Blais and Nadeau, 1992), bearing in mind that their eﬀ ects 
tend to be generalized.
5. Conclusions
 e present study highlights the interconnection between political decisions and 
economic-fi nancial management.  e empirical results obtained provide novel evi-
dence of the infl uence of political and systemic variables on the risk of LG loan default. 
 e results show that some political variables (the mayor’s lack of economics-related 
university studies, a low proportion of female councilors in the municipal corporation, 
the progressive ideology of the governing party and ideological alignment between 
the municipal and the regional government) may contribute to increasing the proba-
bility of loan default, thus heightening the fi nancial risk and problems of insolvency.
Our joint analysis of political and systemic variables shows that the la er are also 
relevant to the risk of default.  us, a rise in the national unemployment rate and in 
the sovereign risk premium, together with the impact of the electoral cycle and of 
declining economic growth, may all increase PD in local government.  ese fi ndings 
suggest that the infl uence of political factors, which in turn depend on the decisions 
taken by citizens in electoral processes, may be aﬀ ected by the evolution of systemic 
variables, which do not depend on these decisions.
 is fi nding represents the empirical corroboration of statements by international 
organizations (European Commission, IMF and the World Bank) and of prior research 
in this fi eld, in that the insolvency problems facing governments arise from both con-
trollable and non-controllable factors, such as systemic variables.
Our joint study of the infl uence of political and systemic variables on credit risk 
provides more complete and representative results than those derived from the indi-
vidual analysis of political factors.  e incorporation of systemic variables into the 
analysis has produced a very signifi cant advance in our understanding of these ques-
tions.  us, the fi nancial risk behavior of LGs is subject to considerable uncertainty 
and the probability of default is aﬀ ected by variables whose evolution is beyond the 
immediate control of policymakers, such as changes in the unemployment rate, in the 
risk premium and in the growth of the national economy.
In short, although systemic variables – which escape the control of citizens and 
of local governments – exert a signifi cant infl uence on default risk, the political deci-
sions of voters, expressed in electoral processes, also impact on this risk, as do factors 
such as the political ideology of the governing party, the educational background of 
the mayor and the gender of municipal councilors.
Finally, our fi ndings represent an advance on those of previous research into the 
question of government debt. Although earlier studies have reported the impact of 
political ideology and of ideological alignment between local and regional govern-
ment on the volume of LG debt, our fi ndings specifi cally identify the infl uence of 
these factors on the risk of debt default. On the other hand, we found no evidence of 
the infl uence on the risk of default by the mayor’s gender or education background, 
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by political fragmentation or by the governing party’s ideological alignment with the 
central government.
 ese fi ndings can be very useful when policy makers must take concrete deci-
sions, for the following reasons: (a) in the fi nancial planning of public policies, the 
eﬀ ect of variables that are not controllable by the rulers must be recognized, measured 
and included in the budget; (b) to avoid or mitigate the risk of default, policy makers 
must be well informed of the detrimental eﬀ ects on the viability of public services of 
factors such as the mayor’s lack of university studies in an economics-related subject, 
governance by a party with a progressive ideology and the under-representation of 
female councilors; (c) the annual budget must be prepared taking into account the 
foreseeable evolution of macroeconomic variables, using multiannual planning tech-
niques and scenario analyses; (d) the eﬀ ect of political variables on the risk of default 
may be contrary to that of the systematic variables, and this in turn would impact on 
the fi nancial planning of public policies.
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